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er, and given no recall, the seller needs a strategy to decide whether to
accept or reject the rst-come oer. The herein derived optimal seller's strategy, which
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1 Introduction
1.1 The motivating problem
The following problem has been posited by a real estate brokerage to the authors of
this paper.
The seller of a house { whether on his own or with the help of a real estate agent,
or perhaps both (cf., e.g., Salant 1991) { sets a list price of the house and requests
the sales agent to proceed with the sale. We refer to, e.g., Zorn and Larsen (1986),
Miceli (1989), Larsen and Park (1989), and Jares et al. (2000), and references therein,
on how to provide incentives for real estate sales agents to act in the best interests of
home sellers.
A number of buyers, some serious and others just curious, view the house, and
perhaps even make exploratory oers, which the seller can use to revise his reservation
price as explained by, e.g., Read (1988). After some time, the sales agent tells the
seller that the matter has reached the stage when there are left only two serious buyers.
Naturally, some bargaining would take place.
Denote the two buyers by the rst letters of their (ctional) names, L and H, and
we do not know, though perhaps attempt to guess, which of the two would be the rst
to make an oer. Let XL and XH be the (random) sale prices if the house is to be sold
to L or H, respectively. After realizing one of the prices, either XL or XH but we do
not know which of the two, the seller needs to decide whether to accept the rst-come
oer or reject it and then bargain with the remaining buyer.
The seller is aware of the fact that if he rejects the rst-come oer, then the rst-
come buyer would exit the process due to reasons such as buying another house, or
simply because of getting his ego hurt, as is quite often the case in such situations.
Hence, there is no recall, and thus if rejected, the buyer exits the process and leaves the
seller with only one buyer, whose oered price, perhaps after some bargaining, would
be accepted as the nal selling price.
The seller wants to have a selling strategy, which needs to be determined prior to
acting on the rst-come oer. The need for such a strategy arises because the seller
feels, naturally, that one of the two oers is likely to be higher than the other one, but
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he does not know which of them { the higher or the lower { will come rst. Hence,
accepting or rejecting the rst-come oer is a crucial step for the seller, and the aim of
the present paper is to oer an optimal strategy for the seller who wishes to maximize
the expected selling price. We call the strategy maximizing.
Our research of the literature, especially of that concerned with strategies in the
real estate business (Subsection 1.2 below), has revealed that the above formulated
problem does not really t into the models considered so far. Certainly, we have greatly
beneted from the literature, but the closest solution to our problem has turned out to
be related to problems, or puzzles, on the theme \which of the two numbers is larger
when only one of them is shown to you?" Here we mention only two such problems:
the two-envelope problem and the secretary problem, with more details and references
to be provided later in this paper.
1.2 A glimpse of the real-estate literature
Optimal strategies for selling assets in general, and thus real estate in particular, have
been actively studied in the literature (e.g., DeGroot 1970; Albright 1977; Riley and
Zeckhauser 1983; Roseneld et al. 1983). Some works assume that the seller receives a
sequence of random bids arriving in a stochastic manner. Some assume that rejected
oers are not lost (recall), and others that they are lost (no recall). Some assume that
the distribution of oers is known, and others that it is not. It is quite often assumed
that the bids are independent and identically distributed random variables. A number
of authors derive stopping-type rules that lead to best strategies for selling assets.
Roseneld et al. (1983) provide a list of selling strategies within various frameworks.
Building upon, and extending, several earlier works (e.g., Stigler 1961; Nelson 1970)
on the economics of information, Gastwirth (1976) has investigated the problem of
consumer search for information about price and quality of goods. He explores a
sequential procedure as a search strategy, which essentially suggests searching until a
price below a threshold has been found. Gastwirth (1976) explores the eects of various
distributions of prices (with bounded and unbounded supports) on the search length,
as well as the eects of possible dependencies between the prices. Recently, Deng
et al. (2013) have analyzed the reservation and asking prices, putting an emphasis {
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articulated already by Stigler (1961) { on the dispersion of prices and also investigating,
among other things, the inuence of the dispersion on pricing strategies that maximize
the return from search.
Naturally, the distribution of prices plays a pivotal role. It has been shown, for
example, that the upper bound of the distribution support may coincide with the
listing price, but it may also exceed it. The list price can be determined by the seller
himself or with the help of a broker (cf., e.g., Salant 1991). The price can also be
predicted { with some success { by inating previous house selling prices (e.g., Brint
2009).
It should be noted that setting the `right' list price is a complex task and plays a
pivotal role in determining factors such as the time on the market (known as TOM) and
the price of the property. These eects of the list price have been explored theoretically
as well as using empirical evidence by Yavas and Yang (1995), Arnold (1999), Anglin
et al. (2003), among others. In the case of a sequential search with recall, Cheng et al.
(2008) have derived a closed form formula of the TOM and the price, and they have
shown in particular that the two quantities follow a nonlinear positive relationship.
Sirmans et al. (1995) have examined the prices of quickly selling houses. Their
model assumes that bids are independent and identically distributed random variables.
Following Lippman and McCall (1976), who suggest and explore a model of job search
based on wage amounts, Sirmans et al. (1995) use a stopping rule as the seller's
strategy: accept the rst bid if it is larger than the reservation price and reject it
otherwise. The authors analyze various quantities such as the optimal reservation price
and how it is aected by holding costs and seller's information about the distribution
of oers.
Glower et al. (1998) have studied how seller's motivation inuences the selling time,
list and nal prices. In particular, they have investigated ve factors that aect the
seller's motivation: 1) the seller has a moving plan at the date of the price listing, 2)
the seller has accepted a new employment prior to the time of the listing, 3) the seller
has made an oer or bought another house at the time of the listing, 4) the sale is
atypical, and 5) the seller has set an incorrect price. The model of Glower et al. (1998)
is without recall, and the number of received oers is not limited.
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Related to the `motivational paradigm,' Anglin (2004) has studied optimal strate-
gies for households that must sell one house in order to buy another. Arnold (1999)
has derived optimal asking and reservation prices. The model of Arnold (1999) as-
sumes that the seller faces buyers arriving according to the Poisson process with some
intensity, and that the asking price, which serves as a starting price in the bargaining
process, aects the intensity of the arrival of potential buyers. Biswas and McHardy
(2007) have studied xed-price and asking-price strategies for selling assets in uncertain
markets, as well as the determination of associated price discounts.
Naturally, earlier derived selling strategies as well as those to be explored later in
this paper hinge on price distributions and other factors. A number of price distribu-
tions have been proposed in the literature. For example, Horowitz (1992) puts forward
a theory of seller's behaviour, suggests a distribution of (random) bids, derives optimal
list and reservation prices, and explains why there are list prices in the housing market
and why bids can sometimes be above the corresponding list prices.
Bid or price distributions can be with nite or innite supports. In Gastwirth
(1976), for example, we nd uniform, triangular, and normal distributions. We can
also argue in favour of the lognormal distribution, but Ohnishi et al. (2011) explain
why the heavier tailed Pareto distribution might be better. In Section 3 below, we
shall use some of these distributions to illustrate our proposed optimal threshold-type
strategies for selling real estate.
Certainly, we have not attempted to give here a general literature overview on
the topic, which is vast and spans through numerous journals on real estate, decision
theory, economics, operations research, management science, and other areas. However,
we hope to have provided a glimpse of those aspects that have been discussed in the
literature and { in one way or another { have profoundly inuenced our thinking on,
and the solution of, the motivating problem formulated above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we put forward a
probabilistic model that corresponds to our motivating example, and we also formulate
natural and practically sound assumptions under which we derive a formula for the
expected selling price. The formula leads to a maximizing seller's strategy in Section
3, where we explore two important cases in detail: 1) the (random) prices XL and
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XH are independent, though not necessarily identically distributed, and 2) the prices
are tied by a dependency relationship. Similarly to the optimal sequential stoping
strategies noted earlier, we shall see in Section 3 that in both cases 1) and 2), we also
arrive at optimal threshold-type strategies: reject the rst-come oer if it is below a
certain threshold and accept it otherwise. Our developed theory provides a constructive
denition of the threshold, which can thus be calculated or estimated in practice.
2 The model and the main theorem
As noted earlier, we do not know which of the two, L or H, will buy the house, as the
outcome depends on factors such as who is going to oer rst and at what price, and
whether the seller accepts or rejects the rst-come oer.
Under this uncertainty, we are interested in maximizing the expected selling price
X = E[X] which naturally depends on a certain seller's strategy. We want to know
this strategy.
We shall next introduce some fairly natural assumptions that will facilitate the
tractability of the aforementioned maximization problem.
2.1 Main assumptions
Let O1 be the random variable that takes on the two `categorical' values L and H: if
O1 = L, then the rst-come oer is by the buyer L, but if O1 = H, then the rst-come
oer is by H.
Next, let R1 be the random variable of rejecting the rst-come oer, that is, R1
takes on the `categorical' value Y (`yes') if the rst-come oer is rejected, and on the
value N (`no') otherwise.
Assumption 2.1 Whether the rst-come oer O1 is made by L or H does not depend
on the (random) prices XL and XH .
From the mathematical point of view, Assumption 2.1 means that the conditional
probability P[O1 = LjXL; XH ] is equal to the unconditional probability
p := P[O1 = L]
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of the rst-come oer by L. (We use `:=' when we want to emphasize that the equality is
by denition.) Consequently, the probability P[O1 = HjXL; XH ] of the rst-come oer
by H given the prices XL and XH is equal to the unconditional probability P[O1 = H];
the latter is equal to 1  p.
Assumption 2.2 The probability of rejecting the rst-come oer depends only on the
amount that the rst-come buyer oers.
Hence, for example, the probability P[R1 = Y jXL = x;XH = y;O1 = H], which
can be rewritten as P[R1 = Y jXL = x;XO1 = y;O1 = H], is equal to
S(y) := P[R1 = Y jXO1 = y]:
We call S the seller's strategy function, or simply the seller's strategy. Hence, S(y)
is the probability of rejecting the rst-come oer of size y irrespectively of whether
L or H makes the oer. Analogous arguments under Assumption 2.2 imply that
P[R1 = N jXL = x;XH = y;O1 = L] is equal to 1  S(x).
Finally, we introduce the benchmark expected price, or BEP for short, which is the
expected selling price if we were always to accept the rst-come oer:
BEP = pE[XL] + (1  p)E[XH ]:
Obviously, BEP is a `strategy-less' quantity.
In the next subsection we shall look at the dierence between X and BEP, where
the seller's strategy S will play a crucial role.
2.2 The main theorem
Depending on the seller's strategy S, the expected selling price X might be higher
or lower than the strategy-less BEP. The following theorem species the strategy risk
parameter (SRP), which is the dierence between X and BEP.
Theorem 2.1 The expected selling price X is the sum of the strategy-less BEP and
the strategy-dependent parameter
SRP(S) := pE
h
S(XL)

E[XH jXL] XL
	i
+ (1  p)E
h
S(XH)

E[XLjXH ] XH
	i
;
which we call the strategy risk parameter (SRP).
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With the help of Theorem 2.1, we can now aim at deriving a strategy S that
maximizes SRP(S) and thus, in turn, X . We shall illustrate this task in detail in
Section 3 below. At the moment we note, for example, that when the prices XL and
XH are independent, then Theorem 2.1 gives the equation
X = BEP + pE
S(XL)E[XH ] + (1  p)ES(XH)E[XL]
  pES(XL)XL  (1  p)ES(XH)XH: (2.1)
When XL and XH are dependent, and assuming for the sake of concreteness that
XH = 2XL as is the case in the two-envelope problem (details in the last paragraph of
this section), we have from Theorem 2.1 that
X = BEP2 + pE

XLS(XL)
  (1  p)ES(2XL); (2.2)
where BEP2 = (2  p)E[XL], which is called the benchmark base return by McDonnell
and Abbott (2009). More generally, when XH = XL for a constant  > 1, then
X = BEP + (  1)pE

XLS(XL)
  (  1)(1  p)ES(XL) (2.3)
with the benchmark expected price BEP =
 
  ( 1)pE[XL]. Obviously, equation
(2.3) implies (2.2) by setting  = 2.
We conclude this section by recalling that in the two-envelope problem there are two
individuals: a host and a player. The host randomly chooses an amount XL of money
and places it into one envelope and also places twice the amount (i.e., XH = 2XL)
into another envelope. The two envelopes are indistinguishable. The player needs to
decide whether to keep the received envelope or exchange it into another one. Once a
decision has been made, the game is over and the host and the player keep the money
that they nd in their respective envelopes.
For an optimal strategy in this game, which has greatly inuenced our present
research, we refer to McDonnell and Abbott (2009), and McDonnell et al. (2011). It
should be noted that there are many ways in which the two-envelope problem can be
formulated, and the literature on the topic is vast. The assumptions of McDonnell
and Abbott (2009) may not conform with all available versions of the two-envelope
problem, but the framework of the noted paper has played a pivotal role in our current
research.
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3 The maximizing strategy
Under various scenarios, in this section we demonstrate how the maximizing strategy
Smax can be derived and how it looks like. The following corollary to Theorem 2.1
provides an explicit form of the strategy.
Corollary 3.1 Assume that the random prices XL and XH have densities fL and fH ,
respectively. Then the maximizing strategy function Smax(y) is the indicator 1A(y) of
the set A = fx 2 [0;1) : Hmax(x) > 0g, where
Hmax(x) = p
n
E[XH jXL = x]  x
o
fL(x) + (1  p)
n
E[XLjXH = x]  x
o
fH(x):
Proof. By the denition of SRP(S) given in Theorem 2.1 and using the assumption
that the random prices XL and XH have densities, we easily arrive at the equation
SRP(S) =
Z
S(x)Hmax(x)dx: (3.1)
Since S(x) is always in the interval [0; 1], the maximizing strategy Smax(x) must be
equal to 1 when Hmax(x) > 0 and 0 when Hmax(x)  0. In other words, Smax(x) must
be the indicator function 1A(x) of the set A dened in the corollary. This nishes the
proof of Corollary 3.1.
As we shall see in the following two subsections, the maximizing strategy Smax is
quite often a threshold type strategy and takes on the form Sb(z) = 1[0;b)(z) where b
is a `threshold' that maximizes SRP(Sb). This strategy means rejecting the rst-come
oer of size z if z < b and accepting it if z  b.
3.1 When the prices XL and XH are independent
Throughout this subsection we assume that the prices XL and XH are independent
random variables. In this case, the maximizing strategy Smax is specied by Corollary
3.1 with the function
Hmax(x) = p

E[XH ]  x
	
fL(x) + (1  p)

E[XL]  x
	
fH(x): (3.2)
We need to nd those x  0 for which Hmax(x) > 0. The likelihood ratio stochastic
dominance (e.g., Denuit et al. 2005; Furman and Zitikis 2008) plays a natural role here.
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Namely, we say that XH is larger or, rather, not smaller than XL in the likelihood ratio
sense, denoted by XH LR XL, if and only if
w(x) =
fH(x)
fL(x)
is a non-decreasing function of x. (3.3)
To make the following considerations more transparent, we assume that XL and
XH have same supports, say the interval (x1; x2) for some 0  x1 < x2  +1. This
means that the two densities fL(x) and fH(x) are (strictly) positive for all x 2 (x1; x2)
and equal to 0 outside the interval (x1; x2).
Note that assumption (3.3) implies that H  L, where H = E[XH ] and L =
E[XL]. To prove this inequality, we write H as follows:
H =
Z
x
fH(x)
fL(x)
fL(x)dx = E

XLw(XL)

:
Consequently, H  L if and only if Cov[XL; w(XL)]  0 because E[w(XL)] =R
fH(x)dx = 1. By Lehmann (1966), the covariance Cov[XL; w(XL)] is non-negative
because the function w is non-decreasing. For related results with possibly non-
monotonic weight functions w, we refer to Egozcue et al. (2011), and references therein.
Theorem 3.1 Under the above assumptions on the densities fL and fH , and in par-
ticular assuming (3.3), we have that
Smax(y) =
8<: 1(x1;b)(y) when L < H ;1(x1;)(y) when L = H (= ); (3.4)
where b = sup

x > L : v(x) > w(x)
	
with
v(x) =
p(H   x)
(1  p)(x  L) :
Proof. The assumptions on the densities fL and fH imply that the means L and H
are in the interval (x1; x2). Moreover, we already know that L  H . Keeping in mind
that fL(x) and fH(x) are (strictly) positive for all x 2 (x1; x2) and equal to 0 outside
the interval (x1; x2), we need to specify those x 2 (x1; x2) for which Hmax(x) > 0.
To this end, we consider the cases L = H and L < H separately; and there can
only be these two cases. When L = H , in which case we denote the two expectations
by , we have Hmax(x) > 0 if and only if x < . Hence, the maximizing strategy is
Smax(y) = 1(x1;)(y).
10
When L < H , then Hmax(x) > 0 for all x 2 (x1; L] and Hmax(x) < 0 for all
x 2 [H ; x2). Hence, it remains to specify those x 2 (L; H) for which Hmax(x) > 0.
The latter bound is equivalent to v(x) > w(x). The function v(x) is decreasing on
the interval (L; H): it starts with an innite value at x = L and ends with the
value 0 at x = H . Since the function w(x) is non-decreasing by assumption (3.3),
we therefore must have a point b 2 (L; H) such that the bound v(x) > w(x) holds
for all x 2 (L; b), and the opposite bound v(x)  w(x) holds for all x 2 [b; H).
Consequently, Smax(y) = 1(x1;b)(y) with the threshold b dened in the formulation of
Theorem 3.1. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
3.2 When XH = XL for a constant  > 1
Here we explore the case when the prices XL and XH are tied via the equation XH =
XL for some constant  > 1. Hence, in particular, fH(x) = (1=)fL(x=) and so, by
equation (3.1) and some little algebra, we have that
SRP(S) = (  1)
Z
S(x)x

pfL(x)  (1  p) 1
2
fL

x


dx: (3.5)
Consequently, the maximizing strategy Smax is given by Corollary 3.1 with the function
Hmax(x) = pfL(x)  (1  p) 1
2
fL

x


; (3.6)
which in the case  = 2 appears on p. 3316 of McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and also
plays a pivotal role throughout the paper of McDonnell et al. (2011).
We shall next illustrate the maximizing strategy Smax in the case of three parametric
distributions that have been noted by several authors dealing with real estate prices
(e.g., Gastwirth 1976; Ohnishi et al. 2011).
3.2.1 Uniform distribution of prices
We start with the uniform on [A;B] distribution, whose density is
fL(x) =
1[A;B](x)
B   A
for some parameters 0  A < B < +1.
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Theorem 3.2 When XL is uniform on [A;B], then
Smax(y) =
8><>:1[A;A)(y) when A  B and p  1=(1 + 
2);
1[A;B](y) otherwise:
(3.7)
Proof. We need to specify those x 2 [A;B] for which
p1[A;B](x)  1  p
2
1[A;B](x) > 0:
This is equivalent to checking the bound
1
p
  1

1
2
1[A;B](x) < 1[A;B](x):
By considering the cases A > B and A  B separately, with the latter case split
into two subcases p  1=(1 + 2) and p > 1=(1 + 2), we arrive at the strategy Smax
given by equation (3.7). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
3.2.2 Lognormal distribution of prices
Here we consider the price XL that follows the log-normal distribution, whose density
is
fL(x) =
1
x
p
2
exp

 
 
log(x)  2
22

1(0;1)(x)
for some parameters  2 ( 1;1) and  > 0.
Theorem 3.3 When XL is log-normal, then
Smax(y) = 1(0;b)(y)
with the threshold
b =
p
 expfg

p
1  p
2= log
: (3.8)
Proof. We check that Hmax(x) dened by equation (3.6) is positive if and only if
p
1
x
p
2
exp

 
 
log(x)  2
22

>
1  p
x
p
2
exp

 
 
log(x=)  2
22

Canceling out some terms and taking the logarithms of both sides, the above inequality
becomes
 
 
log(x)  2
22
> log

1  p
p

 
 
log(x=)  2
22
;
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which is equivalent to the following one:
x < exp

  
2
log
log

1  p
p

+
log
2

=
p
 expfg

p
1  p
2= log
:
The right-hand side is the threshold b, thus nishing the proof of Theorem 3.3.
3.2.3 Pareto distribution of prices
Our nal example deals with the price XL that follows the Pareto distribution, whose
density is
fL(x) =

x0

x0
x
+1
1[x0;+1)(x)
for some parameters x0 > 0 and  > 1. Note that the restriction  > 1 is necessary
for the niteness of the rst moment of XL, which we need. The preference of the
Pareto distribution over the lognormal distribution when modeling house prices has
been noted by Ohnishi et al. (2011).
Theorem 3.4 When XL is Pareto, then
Smax(y) =
8><>:1[x0;x0)(y) when p  1=(1 + 
1 );
1[x0;+1)(y) otherwise:
Proof. We need to know when Hmax(x) dened by equation (3.6) is positive. This is
equivalent to checking the inequality
1[x0;+1)(x) >
1  p
p
 11[x0;+1)(x):
When x 2 [x0; x0), then the above inequality always holds, but when x 2 [x0;1),
then it holds if and only if p > 1=(1+1 ). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
4 Concluding notes
The real estate business is a fascinating laboratory for testing theories and techniques
of decision theory, economics, probability, psychology, sociology, and other research
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areas. It also touches upon several problems, or puzzles, that have fascinated amateur
and professional scientists. In this paper, whose main contribution is an optimal real-
estate seller's strategy in the motivating problem, we have noted a connection between
the motivating problem and the well-known two-envelope problem, in the form of
McDonnell and Abbott (2009), and McDonnell et al. (2011).
Another closely related problem to developing strategies in the real estate business is
the secretary problem, as noted and utilized by Mazalov and Saario (2002), who derived
an optimal threshold-type strategy for setting selling prices under the assumption of
the sequential arrival of buyers. Mazalov and Saario (2002) assume (for the sake of
mathematical simplicity) that the prices are uniformly distributed but their ideas can
be extended to other distributions as well.
One can nd many fascinating connections between the real estate business and
other problems or puzzles of decision theory and related areas, but this has not been
the main goal of the present paper.
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